Sunday, June 14, 2026

The Forgetting — Part 2: How the World Went Flat


It did not happen overnight. That is the first thing to understand. There was no single moment when the church voted to retire the supernatural, no council that declared the invisible world closed for business. What happened was slower and more subtle than that — and for that reason far more difficult to resist.

It happened the way a tide goes out. Gradually, and then all at once.

The shift begins, in the account most historians would recognize, somewhere in the seventeenth century. This is not to say that the Enlightenment was simply wrong about everything — it was not. The development of empirical method, the insistence on evidence, the dismantling of superstitions that had accrued around genuine Christian faith like barnacles — these were not without value. But the method carried hidden assumptions that proved, in time, to be more influential than the findings.

The assumption was this: that the real world is the measurable world. That what cannot be weighed, quantified, and reproduced under controlled conditions is either not real or not relevant. Isaac Newton himself did not hold this view — he was a serious student of Scripture and spent enormous energy on biblical prophecy. But the world that took his mechanics and ran with them arrived at a cosmos that was essentially a machine. Vast, elegant, and empty of presence.

This is what historians of ideas call the disenchantment of the world. The German sociologist Max Weber identified it as the defining feature of modernity — the evacuation of meaning, spirit, and presence from the natural order, leaving behind a universe that runs on impersonal forces and yields its secrets only to mathematics. The gods were gone. The angels were gone. The thin places were paved over. What remained was matter in motion.

The church did not embrace this openly. It would have recognized open embrace as apostasy. What it did instead was something more dangerous — it accommodated. It made peace. It learned, generation by generation, to speak the language of the surrounding culture while quietly retiring the parts of its own language that culture found embarrassing.

The supernatural did not get denied so much as it got domesticated.

Miracles became rare, then exceptional, then the exclusive property of the biblical period — safely historical, impossible to verify, and therefore impossible to be embarrassed by. Angels became decorative — greeting card figures, metaphors for human kindness, a way of saying that something felt providential without committing to the claim that an actual being was involved. The demonic became psychological — a vivid ancient way of describing what we now understand as mental illness, nothing more. The cosmos of Ezekiel and Daniel, of Paul's principalities and powers, of John's Revelation — all of it gradually reinterpreted as the symbolic idiom of a pre-scientific age that the modern mind had outgrown.

And the tragedy is that most of the people doing this reinterpreting were not liberals. They were not theological progressives trying to strip the faith of its content. They were ordinary believers, sitting in orthodox churches, reading their Bibles — but reading them through a set of assumptions about what is real that they had absorbed from the surrounding culture without ever examining. The disenchantment was not something they chose. It was something they caught, the way you catch an accent from the people around you, without noticing it is happening.

This is what makes it so difficult to address. A man who has decided not to believe in angels can be argued with. A man who has never quite gotten around to believing in them, who finds the whole subject faintly awkward, who would not know what to do with them if he did believe — that man is much harder to reach, because he does not think he has a position that needs defending. He thinks he is simply being reasonable.

Industrialization deepened the problem in ways that are easy to underestimate. What the Enlightenment did philosophically, the industrial revolution did experientially. It built an entire world — the world most of us now inhabit — in which the mediation of technology between human beings and raw reality is so complete that the experience of genuine contingency, of dependence, of standing before something that cannot be managed or optimized, has become vanishingly rare.

My Celtic ancestors could not flip a switch and have light. They could not turn a dial and have heat. They could not open an application and have their question answered in seconds. They lived close to the ground, close to the weather, close to birth and death and the rhythms of a creation they did not control. That proximity did not make them better theologians automatically. But it kept them honest about something the modern world works very hard to conceal — that human beings are small, dependent creatures living in a world they did not make and cannot ultimately manage.

When that honesty is removed, something goes with it. Not faith necessarily — not at first. But the felt sense of inhabiting a world where something other than human agency is at work. The sense that the visible is not self-explanatory. The instinct to look up.

And here is the pastoral irony that must be named plainly. Outside the church, materialism is at least consistent. The secular person who believes that matter is all there is, that consciousness is a byproduct of chemistry, that death is simply the end — that person is wrong, but they are not incoherent. Their map matches their behavior.

Inside the church, the same assumptions produce something far stranger. A cognitive dissonance that goes largely unexamined. The creed is affirmed — He maker of heaven and earth, of all things visible and invisible. The prayers are prayed. The resurrection is defended. And then Monday arrives, and the functional map of reality that guides decisions, shapes expectations, and determines what counts as plausible is virtually indistinguishable from that of the secular neighbor.

The invisible world is affirmed on Sunday and forgotten by Tuesday. Not rejected — forgotten. Which is, in some ways, worse.

Because rejection at least implies the thing was real enough to push against. Forgetting implies it was never quite solid enough to hold onto in the first place.

This is where the modern church finds itself. Not apostate, not liberal, not hostile to the faith — but thinned. Operating on a map too small for the territory. Reciting words whose full weight it has quietly ceased to feel.

How that weight might be recovered — and why it matters more urgently now than perhaps at any point in living memory — is where we turn next.

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